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Robert Hinshelwood’s new book is a valuable contribution to the debates concerning 
the scientific status of psychoanalysis, and about how psychoanalytic theories can find 
a rational justification.  Hinshelwood’s primary interest is in the validity of 
psychoanalytic theories of the mind, not in the ‘evidence-based’ measures of treatment 
outcome which now receive most attention.  He has concerns about the proliferation of  
psychoanalytic theories, and about the difficulty in selecting between competing 
theories in the way that he believes natural science does much more successfully.  He 
describes the present situation  where there are overlapping and ill-defined 
psychoanalytic theories, clustered in different schools and followings, with little capacity 
for resolution of differences, as a Tower of Babel. In this view Hinshelwood is taking up 
concerns previously set out in studies of psychoanalytic practice for example by Robert 
Wallerstein (1988) and David Tuckett (2005). His book proposes a critical procedure by 
which competing theories can be subjected to decisive empirical test. 
 
Hinshelwood believes that the fundamental critique of psychoanalysis first advanced by 
Karl Popper in 1963 , and developed by Adolf Grünbaum in 1984 and 1993 has never 
been adequately refuted.  He accepts as an essentially valid model of scientific 
procedure Popper’s ‘hypothetico-deductive method’,  originally set out  in The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery in 1935.  According to this, scientific theories set out 
generalisations, or universal laws, which are subjected to the test of empirical 
falsification through controlled experiments or observations.  This model contrasts with 
the ‘inductive method’  according to which knowledge is advanced through the 
accumulation of positive evidence for theories, which Popper believed cannot  generate 
scientific knowledge. Popper attacked as ‘pseudo-sciences’ those theoretical systems, 
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notably Marxism and psychoanalysis, which pretended to the status of a science but 
failed to meet the requirement of testing by empirical falsification.1 
 
Hinshelwood holds that it is because psychoanalysis has not been able to respond 
adequately to this  ‘modern’ view of scientific method that it has found it difficult to 
justify itself. He  implies that previously psychoanalysis had found itself on stronger 
ground, but says little about this earlier  phase.2  The most significant  critiques of 
psychoanalysis in a book edited by Sidney Hook (1959)  and in Popper’s writing, date 
from 1959 and 1963,  were advanced in the context of a predominantly ‘positivist’ 
climate in Anglo-American philosophy.  To call these positions ‘modern’ glosses over 
much of the debate on the nature of science that has since taken place. Nevertheless, 
this critique provides Hinshelwood’s main point of orientation, and Popper and 
Grünbaum have more index citations than any author other than Freud. What he 
wishes to show is that psychoanalysis can, if its procedures are appropriately 
reformulated, meet the central Popperian criterion of scientific truth, which is that 
theories must be validated by the criterion of empirical falsifiability.   
 
It is important in setting out an argument like this that an adequate  account is given of 
the psychoanalytic theories and methods which are to be tested.  There are two main  
respects in which the Hinshelwood sets out to do this. The first is in his emphasis on 
the clinical case study, and often the ‘single case study’, as the primary source of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. Against the common misrepresentation of the natural 
sciences as essentially quantitative in their approach, Hinshelwood argues that many 
fundamental scientific discoveries have been made from the investigation, often in 
laboratory conditions, of single (or very few)  instances. An  example he gives of 
falsification by a single instance is  Columbus’s voyage of 1492,  which allegedly 
showed through a single natural experiment that the earth was round, and not flat. In 
fact it appears  that neither  Columbus nor those of learning in his time any longer 
                                            
1 Popper’s own remarks on this  topic were extremely brief, in Conjectures and Refutations  (1963)  but 
his critique was carried forward, in various forms by other writers, such as Cioffi 1998,  Gellner 1985, and 
Grünbaum, op cit.   
2 John Forrester’s work on the influence of psychoanalysis in Cambridge in the 1930s does discuss this 
receptive climate, but in historical rather than philosophical terms. See his various papers accessible at 
http://www.hps.cam.ac.uk/people/forrester/at  
 
 
 
3 
 
believed in ‘flat earth’ theory.  But although this example does not seem a good one, 
the main point about intensive forms of investigation can be well documented from the 
history of the natural sciences. Hinshelwood’s inference is that since single case 
studies  generate valid knowledge in the  natural sciences, they should equally be 
expected to do so in psychoanalysis. The question then is how to design such a model 
of validation. 
 
The second way in which Hinshelwood aims to describe psychoanalysis as it is (rather 
than abandon its principles to make its research more respectable) is his insistence 
that the dimensions of both cause and meaning are necessary to psychoanalytic 
explanation.  He rightly argues against an exclusive  interest in relations of cause and 
effect, and against giving attention only to ‘subjective meanings’ – the  ‘hermeneutic’  
perspective. The  hermeneutic perspective disavows the significance of ‘objective’ 
knowledge in psychoanalysis – subjective coherence rather than truth becomes its 
goal.  Hinshelwood associates this with a ‘postmodern’ orientation, in which all 
representations of reality are understood to be interpretations, whether by individuals or  
cultures.  In that perspective, psychoanalysis is seen not as a search for psychic truth 
by analyst and patient, but rather as the co-construction between them of descriptions 
and narratives which are found to be satisfying. This is a recognisable position in 
modern psychoanalysis (for example   within the ‘relational school’ in the USA), but 
Hinshelwood rejects it.  Like other Kleinians, (e.g. O’Shaughnessy 1994) he holds that 
psychoanalytic propositions about psychic reality can be ascertained to be true or false.   
 
In defence of the view that the psychoanalytic view of the mind must take account of 
both reasons or subjective meanings, and causes, Hinshelwood draws on the  
philosopher Donald Davidson’s view that  ‘reasons’  can  themselves be causes of  
human actions. One therefore need not choose between ‘reasons’ and causes’  as if 
these were incompatible modes of explanation.3  
 
What  is necessarily distinctive about psychoanalysis (compared with the natural 
sciences) is that it depends on ways of thinking which are shared by its investigators 
                                            
3 Incidentally Hinshelwood  mistakenly attributes to Paul Ricoeur the view that psychoanalysis is 
concerned with meanings only.  Ricoeur  (1977)  argues that both dimensions must be part of 
psychoanalytic explanation.    
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(analysts) and its objects of investigation (analysands).  He argues that in the natural  
sciences the instruments used for  observation  and measurement are distinct from the 
‘objects’ which are being studied. The validity of the means of investigation thus 
depends on theories distinct from those used to explain the phenomena being studied.   
In psychoanalysis, however, the same theories about unconscious processes are used 
both to understand mental states, and the interactions in the transference by which 
these are observed.  What valid test of  the existence of an unconscious process can 
there be, Hinshelwood asks, if its existence is presupposed in its method of discovery? 
 
Hinshelwood tries to avoid this risk of circularity by differentiating between two 
elements of  psychoanalytic investigation – one concerned with content and the other 
with process.  He proposes, drawing on Wallerstein, that a ‘hermeneutic’ method be 
used to formulate hypotheses concerning the ‘content’ or metapsychological structure 
of a patient’s mind, and that a ‘causal’ method be used to test such hypotheses in the 
psychoanalytical process which  consists of  transference-countertransference 
interactions,  analysts’ interpretations, and patients’ responses to them.  The idea that 
the existence of, and causal relations between the entities postulated by a scientific 
hypothesis needs to be tested by independent methods of observing them is surely 
correct. What is less clear is that there is anything distinctive in this regard about 
psychoanalysis, compared with other kinds of scientific inquiry.4   
 
One of Hinshelwood’s purposes here is to respond to Grünbaum ’s principal criticism of 
Freud’s scientific method.  He argued against Freud’s ‘tally principle’ that the truth of 
interpretations could not be ascertained by the analysing’s agreement with them, 
because an analysing’s  response is subject to the influence ‘by suggestion’ of the 
analyst. This is a kind of  ‘circularity’ related to that which Hinshelwood has identified. 
According to Grünbaum an analysand is not free  to make use of criteria of evaluation 
distinct from those implied in interpretations  (For example, an analysand’s 
disagreement is liable to be interpreted as ‘resistance’.) 5 
                                            
4 The instruments of measurement used in physics or chemistry do not disavow the theories of physics or 
chemistry in their construction. Care is merely taken to make sure that the outcome of an observation is 
not presupposed in its design.  Similarly in psychoanalysis, while one cannot use transference to  
establish the existence of  transference, one can make use of the transference to establish the existence 
in patients of various unconscious states of mind, such as Oedipal jealousy.   
5 Grünbaum ‘s description is recognisable, but I doubt that his account  corresponds to good analytic 
practice (Wollheim 1993). Discriminations are surely made between responses to interpretations which 
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Having set out these  issues,  Hinshelwood sets out a model through which clinical 
hypotheses can be formulated and tested in a way which will satisfy the criteria of 
falsifiability.  He gives examples both from published clinical literature, and from his 
own clinical work. He proposes that one can test ‘theoretical conjectures’  (to use 
Popper’s term)  from the written, preferably verbatim,  clinical record of  a session, by 
reference to a patient’s response to an interpretation. He gives as an example dispute 
between Kleinians, who hold that ‘it is necessary to interpret envy in severe disorders’, 
and those who hold that ‘what Kleinians interpret as envy can be understood as simply 
deriving from other negative emotions, notably frustration and jealousy.’  He suggests a 
procedure to resolve whether envy is or is not evident, within a segment of clinical 
material.  If it is, he infers, then the existence of envy is supported by this test of 
falsification.  Hinshelwood’s contention is that a  hypothesis can be justifiably rejected if 
a single countervailing instance to it can be found.   
 
The limitation of this argument for psychoanalysis is not that such tests of validity are 
not possible, but rather that the major theoretical differences are not about the 
existence or otherwise of a state of mind such as envy  but rather about its 
pervasiveness, its origins and its consequences. The scope of application of a concept, 
and its explanatory value, are established  not by a single instance, but in research 
programmes over periods of time.  It is true that new ideas in psychoanalysis (like 
those of destructive narcissism, or the heuristic value of the countertransference)  often 
enter the field through the presentation of an exemplary case example, but their value 
becomes established only through their being found  to have useful clinical application.    
 
The broad principle that hypotheses need to be tested by empirical falsification should 
not be contentious for psychoanalysts. Indeed such procedures  correspond to what is 
found in good practice.  In their clinical work,  analysts surely evaluate the validity of 
their  understandings  and interpretations, by continuing observation of their patients’ 
                                                                                                                                        
are merely compliant, and those which signify real understanding.  Analysts decide whether an analysis is 
going well by reference to whether a patient’s own capacities for feeling and thought has been enhanced, 
not by how far their previous theories are being confirmed. New analytic ideas have most often  emerged 
in response to discordance between prior theoretical beliefs, and  clinical evidence. (Rustin 2001,   
Hughes 2004.) 
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states of mind  and their responses to what is said to them. How could progress be 
made in understanding  patients  without continuous monitoring of the validity of 
analysts’ conjectures?  Such procedures of evaluation are equally central to clinical 
research, when the understanding of a particular patient gives rise to the recognition of 
a phenomenon of a new kind, perhaps a hitherto unrecognised kind of 
psychopathology.   
 
In a significant sense, we all are, or need to be, Popperians now, in the sense that it is 
essential to any scientific process that discriminations be made, on the basis of factual 
evidence of a relevant kind, between true and false hypotheses.  Without such 
procedures, there can be nothing but mere opinion, with all the departures from rational 
practice that Hinshelwood and others have noted can and do occur in the 
psychoanalytic field.    
 
Some disagreements   
 
Nevertheless, for all the intended rigour of this book’s approach, there are some  
respects in which I think it is mistaken. The main  problem lies in the limitations of the 
Popperian approach to scientific method  which Hinshelwood has adopted as his 
standard. He takes too little account of what has happened in the understanding of the 
sciences since Popper’s contribution was made cades ago.  
 
He does provide some discussion of one essential point of reference for these debates, 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), but he takes insufficient   
account of this.  More important than the philosophical arguments about validity and 
proof in which Popper and Kuhn and their respective allies have engaged is the change 
of perspective which Kuhn’s work initiated. Kuhn was primarily a historian not a 
philosopher of  science.  His approach was descriptive rather than legislative and 
normative.  He was not so much interested in the criteria which might differentiate good 
science from bad science, as in describing and explaining the actual practices of 
scientists.   
 
Popper believed that the accumulation of scientific knowledge took place through the 
competition of rival theories. Because  theories necessarily make  universal claims, 
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from which predictions can be inferred, empirical falsification could decisively resolve 
differences  between them. The intellectual context of this view was the success of 
physics in transforming the understanding of nature, both in the seventeenth century 
(e.g. Newton and Galileo) and in the  early twentieth centuries ( Einstein).  Hinshelwood 
holds that arguments between differing psychoanalytic theories should be similarly 
resolved by tests of the causal relations which they entail.    
 
But in Kuhn’s account the crucial unit of analysis for understanding the sciences was  
not the truth or falsity of a specific hypothesis, but rather the explanatory power of an  
‘paradigm’. A paradigm is  more than a specific theory. It defines a field of study, its 
‘key ‘objects’ and entities, its appropriate methods’.  Kuhn wrote of ‘gestalt  switches’ 
taking place between paradigms, 6   making a crucial distinction between  
‘revolutionary’ and ‘normal’ science.  A ‘scientific revolution’ takes place when the 
linked concepts and theories which comprise a paradigm are abandoned, and are  
replaced by another set of ideas. Kuhn suggests that this may redefine a field of study, 
in a way that may bring entirely new ‘objects’ into view.  (Freud’s unconscious was just 
such a new ‘object’.)  ‘Normal science’ consists of the solving of the routine ‘puzzles’   
which are generated by the framing propositions of a new paradigm. An example is the 
evolutionary science’ which has been conducted for 150 years  on the foundations of 
Darwin’s theory. Within an established science, few practising scientists concern 
themselves debating the validity of its core propositions, which they take as already 
established.  Kuhn (2000) described what took place in normal science as a process of 
‘speciation’ -  the differentiation of theories and classifications to take account of the 
variety  of  phenomena which a paradigm encompassed.  
 
Imre Lakatos, an associate of Popper cited by Hinshelwood, accepted Kuhn’s holistic 
and developmental perspective, but  sought to retain the  criterion of falsifiability.  For 
him the crucial unit of analysis was not the paradigm, but the research programme. He 
acknowledged the complex and holistic nature of such programmes, and the 
substantial evidence which they accumulated, but saw that they were unlikely to be 
abandoned in response to a particular  empirical anomaly, as Popper’s falsification 
criterion suggested they should be.  The crucial issue for Lakatos was whether a 
                                            
6 (Stephen Toulmin, from a broadly sympathetic position, argued that the process of change is usually a 
more long-drawn out one than this.) 
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research programme took a ‘progressive’  or a ‘degenerative’ form.  ‘Progressive 
problem shifts’ were those which extended the scope of a programme in empirically 
testable ways. The ‘degenerative’ kinds  were those which a programme defended 
itself against negative evidence through  conceptual redefinition. (Popper asserted that 
this practice was endemic to psychoanalysis).  The problem is that whether a 
programme is  ‘progressive’ or otherwise can only be decided in the long run, since it 
becomes a matter of judgement how much significance to accord to particular 
anomalies. Within a well-established research programme, it is often more rational to 
take note of an empirical problem as one to be attended to once improved research 
methods become available, than to discard an entire  theoretical framework on its 
account.   
 
In this light, the crucial question to ask is whether psychoanalysis constitutes a  
‘research programme’ of an essentially progressive or degenerative kind.  Here one is 
struck by the dysjunction within two  different areas of Hinshelwood’s own work. His  
new book  sets out a philosophical critique of the methodological deficiences of 
psychoanalysis, implying that it lies closer to the ‘degenerative’ end of Lakatos’s 
spectrum of research programmes. But on the other hand,  his magisterial Dictionary of 
Kleinian Thought, is a fully-referenced account of the Kleinian ‘branch’ of 
psychoanalytic thought,  encompassing both its theory and clinical technique. This 
book and its successors (Hinshelwood 1994, , Spillius et al 2012) are  surely exemplary 
descriptions of the record of a ‘progressive’ research programme7 .  In each stage of its 
development of this programme,  clinical researchers have surely tested their 
conjectures against clinical evidence, in an implicitly ‘Popperian’ spirit 8  
 
A similarly ‘progressive’   account can be given of the development of child 
psychotherapy, as a  sub-field within psychoanalysis.  Much ‘speciation’ has occurred 
within it,  for  example the investigations of psychotherapy with severely  deprived 
children, through clinical research. There has been a significant accumulation of 
knowledge, by a generation of child psychotherapists, whose discoveries have in  their 
turn enriched clinical practice. (Rustin 2009).    
 
                                            
7 Or more precisely sub-programme within the larger field of knowledge of psychoanalysis.  
8 I have sought to demonstrate how this happens, in various papers (Rustin 2001, 2007, 2009).  
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Historical and sociological studies of science have brought  recognition of the diversity 
of scientific practices, whereas by contrast philosophical approaches concerned 
primarily with issues of validity usually represent ‘science’  as a unified field.  In 
Popper’s work, physics provided  the ideal-typical model by which criteria of validity are 
set.  Hinshelwood often  refers to ‘science’ and ‘natural science’ as if these are 
unproblematic categories, and displays little interest in the specificities of any science 
other than psychoanalysis.  But if one holds that the sciences are diverse in their 
objects and methods of study  (Galison and Stump 1996), although with some 
principles common to all of them, it is important to clarify with which sciences 
psychoanalysis is most relevantly compared. For example, where physics is based on 
extraordinarily powerful  laws of universal, indeed cosmic application, Darwinian 
biology and ecology investigates  vast fields of particulars, concerning species and their 
interrelations.     
 
Psychoanalysis is unlike other sciences in being concerned not only with differences 
between kinds within its field of study, but also with the unique qualities of individuals 
as such.  Its concern with the particulars as well as with the kinds of human experience 
is what gives psychoanalysis the qualities of an art as well as a science. Hinshelwood 
implicitly  supports this view when he insists on the ‘hermeneutic’  as well as the causal 
aspects of psychoanalytic knowledge.  Psychoanalysis is only useful to individuals 
when it relates to their own subjectivity. It  holds that understanding should further 
choice and change for individuals. This is also so at a larger level, for  example in 
Freud’s understanding of the benign consequences for society of the lessening of 
sexual repression.9 While predictions of a general or ‘typical’ kind can be made within a 
psychoanalytic process precise outcomes can never be predicted, in part because the 
analytic setting is an  ‘open’ and not a ‘closed’ system.10   Whereas some psychologies 
seem to work by standardised diagnoses and treatment objectives,  psychoanalysis 
approaches its patients as, in many respects, unique individuals.   
 
                                            
9 Ernest Gellner’s (1995) recognition of the importance of this central insight of Freud gave rise to a much 
more  positive appreciation of his work than was to be found in his earlier The Psychoanalytic Movement. 
(Gellner 1985).  
10 I have argued elsewhere  (Rustin 2001) that the consulting room has some of the attributes of the 
scientific laboratory. Nevertheless there are many ‘variables’ within  this setting that the analyst does not 
control.  
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How then should we understand the problems of validating competing psychoanalytic 
theories?   Hinshelwood proposes that a method of testing by falsification could enable 
fundamental differences between them to be resolved, and thus a unification of 
theories be achieved.  But if Kuhn and Lakatos were right, and the primary containers 
of psychoanalytic knowledge are holistic  research programmes this does not seem to 
be a plausible prospect.  The  major traditions within psychoanalysis  each constitute in 
their own way viable ‘sub-programmes’ of  research, generating valid knowledge within 
their own selected fields of application. Each  of them has ways of differentiating 
between valid and invalid practices.  Hinshelwood’s own work has shown how the 
Kleinian sub-field of analysis has added substantially to its scope of knowledge over 
time, developing  more extensive vocabularies  of theory and of clinical instances which 
are available as a ‘bank’ of conceptual resources for clinicians as they meet  the  
phenomena of their consulting rooms.  Some in the natural sciences aspire to the 
unification of all scientific knowledge  usually  through the explanatory power of 
physics11.  But this seems neither a feasible nor a desirable aspiration for the human 
sciences, where differences and development  are held to be of  intrinsic value, and 
even as among their emancipatory goals. 12 
 
A Tower of Babel?  
 
A final question to consider is how concerned one should  be about the multiplicity of 
theories there are within psychoanalysis. Is this a weakness which undermines the 
legitimacy of this  field of inquiry, and can the model of theory-testing which 
Hinshelwood sets out be a  means for resolving such differences? 
 
Important as questions of scientific proof are, one should also note that psychoanalysis 
is not unique among the human sciences in its proliferation of  competing perspectives. 
Sociology, economics, political science and anthropology,  not to mention philosophy 
and history, are  all  characterised by such differences. The human sciences do not 
exhibit the same pattern of theoretical convergence as can be seen in the natural 
                                            
11 This is a view which the physicist Brian Cox has put forward in his 2013  television series. 
12 Anthony Giddens (1984. P.284)  has argued that sociology is characterised by a ‘double hermeneutic’.  
He refers by this to the interactions between the categories used by subjects, and those used by the 
social scientists who study them.  Each influences the other, in a reciprocal process.  This description 
applies to psychoanalysis too, in its relation both to individuals and to society.  
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sciences, not that it is always a straightforward process in the latter. The main reason 
for this pattern of differences is the central place of values in the development of  the 
human science disciplines. Different conceptions of human nature and society underlie 
both the principles of separate ‘subjects’ (economics and anthropology for example), 
and conflicting orientations within them. (In sociology, the theoretical differences 
derived from Marx, Weber and Durkheim have long been significant). Such  
perspectives remain active over long periods of time because they are resources for 
conducting arguments about what is desirable and possible in human affairs.13  
 
Such differences, shaped by cultural and historical contexts, also explain why there 
continue to be competing theoretical perspectives in psychoanalysis.  It is evident that 
the framings of, for example, ego psychology and relational psychology in the United 
States, Lacanian perspectives in France,  and object relations approaches in Britain, 
have been deeply shaped by the dominant social norms and values of their national  
cultures.  
 
Psychoanalysis is of its nature  a highly particular and ‘local’ activity – it takes place 
where the patients are, and the mechanisms  which  bring about convergence in many 
other scientific fields (such as institutionally funded research institutes and 
programmes) are weak in psychoanalysis. Within specific psychoanalytic traditions 
(which are not bounded entirely by national frontiers) procedures for resolving 
differences of theory and technique often do take an orderly and rational form,  through 
publication and critical professional  assessment. It is striking for example how much 
dialogue and theoretical convergence there has been in Britain between the 
contemporary Freudian, Independent, and Kleinian Schools. Such dialogue is more 
difficult to conduct outside of national contexts within which many theoretical 
presuppositions are shared. It is perhaps among those  who take most responsibility  
for maintaining the international identity of psychoanalysis, in the IPA and EPF for 
example, that concerns about theoretical disharmony are felt to be most pressing. 
 
                                            
13 Another  perspective on the plurality of the sciences arises  from Wittgenstein’s philosophy. We might 
suppose that different science are configured as distinct ‘language games’, linked by ‘family 
resemblances’, not by their identity or uniformity. This point was recently made by John Levett in a 
response to Hinshelwood.  
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Hinshelwood is among a number of psychoanalysts who have sought to give 
psychoanalytic thought a greater scientific legitimacy by enhancing its methods of 
investigation and validation.  But the  acceptance and standing of psychoanalysis in 
society may have more to do with dominant social  values and cultures, than with 
questions of scientific method.  Psychoanalytic belief in an unconscious mind which is  
resistant to understanding, and in reflection on states of mind and feeling as a principal 
resource for human development does not sit easily in every culture.  
 
It is valuable that Bob Hinshelwood has given such careful attention to the issues of 
scientific method in psychoanalysis, especially at a time when many  child 
psychotherapists in particular are seeking to give a more accountable basis to the 
development of psychoanalytic knowledge through doctoral and other research 
programmes.14  It is particularly valuable  in the context of present debates that he has 
placed his principal emphasis on clinical practice as the primary context of knowledge 
generation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
14 The use of ‘grounded theory’ and similar qualitative research methods is a notable feature of this work, 
reported in this Journal (Anderson  2006).  
13 
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